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desirable change to liability of the employer of an independent contractor for
all tortious acts of the latter and his servants and the confinement of non-
liability to a few exceptional situations. 1 5  W. A. V.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEPOSITOR OF COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK-BANK
COLLECTION CODE.-The defendant, a Louisiana manufacturer, drew a draft on
a milling company in South Carolina for the purchase price of a shipment of
rice. The draft was made payable to .a local Louisiana bank and was
deposited in that bank under a deposit slip customarily used by it for cash
items which contained a provision printed at the top, "In receiving items
for deposit or collection, this bank acts only as depositor's collecting agent
and assumes no responsibility beyond the exercise of due care. All items are
credited subject to final payment in cash or solvent credits whether returned
or not." The evidence was that unconditional credit was immediately given
the milling company. The bank received iriterest, termed a .discount, on the
amount of the draft for the time that the draft was outstanding. In due
course, the draft and attached papers were sent to correspondent bank in
South Carolina. The day the draft was collected by the correspondent, the
plaintiff attached the proceeds in South Carolina for satisfaction of an un-
liquidated demand against the defendant depositor. The initial bank inter-
vened on the appeal, claiming to be the owner of the fund. Held, title passed
to the initial bank at time of the deposit and therefore the plaintiff could not
attach the proceeds. Campbell v. Noble-Trotter Rice Milling Co. (S. C. 1938),
198 S. E. 373.
The increase in use of commercial paper in the United States under our
great credit system of business has left a multitude of irreconcilable decisions
on the circumstances under which a bank, in taking from a customer a check
or draft in the usual course of its banking business, will become the owner
of such check or draft as distinguished from a mere collecting agent for the
customer. It has been generally recognized in regard to bank deposits that
where a deposit is made in a bank in the ordinary course of business, the title
to the money or to the drafts or checks deposited, in the absence of any special
agreement or direction, passes to the bank, and the relation of debtor and
creditor arises between the depositor and the bank.1 Where the facts and
circumstances accompanying the deposit indicate an understanding between
the parties that the commercial paper is deposited for collection only, the
15 Comment, Responsibility for the torts of an independent contractor, 39
Yale L. J. 861 (1930), suggests the possibility and advantages of giving the
injured party his election to sue the general employer or the independent
contractor, as well as the feasibility of allowing the exceptions to the general
rule to supersede the rule itself; Harper, The Law of Tort, Sec. 292; Morris,
The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 Illinois L. Rev. 339 (1934) ;
Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Con-
tractor, 10 Indiana L. J. 494 (1935), suggesting that "upon both 'judge's
reasoning' and 'law professor's rationalizations' we are entitled to expect a
uniform rule of joint liability of the independent contractor and his employer,"
but that such rule does not exist and will not be immediately forthcoming.
'Downey v. National Exchange Bank (1912), 52 Ind. App. 672, 96 N. E.
403; Burton v. U. S. (1905), 196 U. S. 283, 25 S. Ct. 243; Michie on Banks &
Banking, Vol. 5, page 9.
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weight of authority is that title does not pass to the bank. Since, however,
most deposits are made without any express agreement the intent of the parties
is deemed to control.2 As to the application of the various tests as determin-
ing factors in ascertaining the intention of the parties there is a great conflict
of authority.
Where the depositor has made a deposit for a special purpose or has
restrictively indorsed "for collection" the authorities seem settled that title to
the paper does not pass to the bank.3 In situations in which credit is given
the depositor, but it is not determined whether the depositor has an immediate
right to draw on the same, the cases are in great dispute but with a numerical
majority of cases holding that title passes. 4 According to the cases which
adhere to the rule that title remains in the depositor, the courts will always
stress the factor of the bank's right to charge back upon dishonor as being
inconsistent with ownership in the bank;5 but cases holding that title passes,
reconcile this as merely a method of enforcing the depositor's liability as
indorser.6 The strongest point of intention of title passing appears in the
depositor having a right to draw on the credit;7 cases holding that the agency
relation may still exist rationalize the right to draw against a credit so
2 In Olinger v. Sanders (1931), 92 Ind. App. 358, 174 N. E. 513, the court
stated that whether or not a deposit was general or special was a question of
fact for the jury. Facts to be considered are: depositor is immediately given
credit for the amount in his passbook, and upon the books of the bank; that
he is immediately given the right to check against the deposit, that he actually
does check agaitist the same.
SBoston Continental Nat'l Bank v. Hub Fruit Co. (1934), 285 Mass. 187,
189 N. E. 89; First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank (1881), 76 Ind. 561, 40 Am.
Rep. 261.
4 Mudd v. Farmer Bank (1913), 175 Mo. 378, 162 S. W. 314. See 11
A. L. R. 1060, 16 A. L. R. 1084, 42 A. L. R. 495, 68 A. L. R. 730, 99 A. L. R.
490, for compilation of cases.
5 Armour Packing Co. v. Davis (1896), 18 N. C. 548, 24 S. E. 365; Joppe
v. Clark Commission Co. (1929), 132 Ore. 21, 281 P. 834. Also see Bolles,
"When Is a Bank the B. F. P. of a Check Left for Deposit or Collection?"
(1908), 58 U. of Pennsylvania L. Rev. 375, 378.
6 Equitable Trust v. Rochling (1927), 275 U. S. 248; Beacher v. Nat'l Bank
(1926), 151 Md. 514, 35 At]. 383. Prior to 1905, the majority of courts were
moved by the factor of a right to charge back as inconsistent with ownership,
but after the United States Supreme Court in Burton v. United States (1905),
196 United States 283, held this merely a method of enforcing the depositor's
liability as endorser, a distinct trend following this change in view can be no-
ticed. Townsend in "Bank Deposits of Commercial Paper," 7 New York U. L.
Quarterly Rev. 272, compares bank deposits of commercial paper with a sale
of chattels on the sale and return basis.
7The Georgia Court in Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Myer (1892), 89 Ga. 108,
14 S. E. 891, with a factual situation similar to the noted case, held title
passed; therefore, a creditor couldn't garnishee, and distinguished it from a
previous Georgia case, Freeman v. Exchange Bank (1891), 87 Ga. 45, 13 S. E.
160, where facts were almost identical, except it did not appear that the
depositor had the right to draw against the proceeds of the check before they
were collected. Also see American Trust & Saving Bank v. Gueder & P. Mfg.
Co. (1894), 150 Ill. 336, 37 N. E. 227; National City Bank v. Macon Creamery
Co. (1932), 329 Mo. 639, 46 S. W. (2d) 127; Olinger v. Sanders (1931), 92
Ind. App. 358, 174 N. E. 513.
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obtained as a mere gratuitous privilege and a bank may have a lien on the
paper as collateral security.8
The closest approach to an agreement between the parties is usually found
in notices in the deposit slips and pass-books which most generally state that
the bank takes paper as an agent or that drafts and commercial paper are
"entered for collection." In considering cases as a whole there appear to
be two theories; one, that such agreements prevent title from passing, and
the other, which is the majority, that this is evidence to be considered along
with other factors as to the intent of the parties but not conclusive.9 Another
method of determining the intent is whether the paper is deposited as "paper"
or as "cash." In discussing this, the Indiana court has said, "There can be no
reason why, if parties choose to treat a deposit of paper or other securities
as cash, so that it is available to the depositor as cash, the transaction should
not be regarded as equivalent to a deposit of money."' 0
Motivated by the conflict of decisions, there have been two attempts to
make the law on this subject of deposit of commercial paper more definite
and uniform by legislation; the American Banker's Association through the
Bank Collection Code, and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws by
the Uniform Bank Collection Act. The former has been adopted in Indiana
and seventeen other states1 l while the latter is still in tentative form.12
8 Joppe v. Clark Commission Co. (1929), 132 Ore. 21, 281 P. 834; Stude-
baker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), 42 S. W. 573.
It should be noted that Section 2 of the Banker's Code expressly provides that,
"where any such bank allows any revocable credit for an item to be with-
drawn, such agency relation shall nevertheless continue, except the bank shall
have all the rights of an owner thereof against prior and subsequent parties
to the extent of the amount withdrawn." Burns 1933, 18-2502.
9 Held title didn't pass if notice in slip or pass-book: People's State Bank
v. Miller (1915), 185 Mich. 565, 152 N. W. 257; South Park Foundry &
Machine Co. v. Chicago G. W. R. C. (1897), 75 Minn. 186, 771 N. W. 796;
Macon Grocery Co. v. Citizens' Bank (1930), 42 Ga. App. 74, 155 S. E. 57.
Held-Only evidence to be considered. Douglas v. Federal Res. Bank (1926),
271 U. S. 489, 70 L. Ed. 105; Western Creamery Co. v. Malia (Utah 1936),
57 P. (2d) 743.
-1 Wasson v. Lamb (1889), 120 Ind. 514, 22 N. E. 729. It should also be
noted that the cases involving paper payable directly to the bank have been
treated very much the same as those involving paper payable to the depositor
or another, and indorsed to the bank. In some cases, the fact that the paper
is payable directly to the bank is emphasized; where a creditor draws a draft
on his customer and makes it payable directly to his bank, and it is then
credited to his account, with the right to drawL thereon, it is held that title
passes; Merchants Bank v. Scary Wholesale'Groc. Co. (1924), 66 Ark. 153,
265 S. W. 961; but Dubuque Fruit Co. v. C. C. Emerson & Co. (1926), 201
Iowa 129, 206 N. W. 672, held it a matter of presumption only.
11 Indiana Burns' Ann. Statutes (1933), 18-2501 to 18-2517; Acts of 1929,
Ch. 164, p. 514. This Code should not be confused with any of the uniform
acts put out by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, for this act is a
creation of the Counsel for the American Bankers' Assoc., Mr. Paton. Sec-
tion 2 of the Code "(18-2502)--"Except as otherwise provided by agreement
and except as to subsequent holders of a negotiable instrument payable to
bearer or indorsed specially or in blank, where an item is deposited or reeeived
for collection, the bank of deposit shall be agent of the depositor for its
collection."
12 For Fifth Tentative Draft of Uniform Bank Collection Act see Hand-
book of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
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The Bankers' Code (Section 2) is designed to place all paper received by a
bank on an agency basis except where "otherwise provided by agreement."
No test of what fact will evidence an agreement to the contrary is stated
in the statute, and the provision has already been subjected to conflicting
interpretation.
The Missouri Appellate Courtl3 has found an implied agreement to the
contrary out of the factors which under the common law were evidence of
an intent of a purchase rather than an agency. However, on appeal to the
Missouri Supreme Court,1 4 the court refused to defeat the purpose of the code,
and said, "We cannot give effect to an implied agreement of the sale of the
check to the bank; implied, if at all, from the very facts which the statute
says shall not change the agency relation." The South Carolina Supreme
Court, in Lawton v. Lower Main Street Bank,1 5 by means of restrictive
statutory construction held Section Two not applicable to a deposit similar
to case at bar by saying that the words of the section, "Where an item is
deposited or received for collection" means "Where an item is deposited for
collection or is received for collection," (by the use of a comma this interpreta-
tion might have been prevented) and hence under the general rule such a
deposit and credit make the bank a purchaser and the item is not deposited
for collection.
In the noted case although it was tried in South Carolina, the court was
bound by the rules of conflicts of law to apply the law of Louisiana, which
has not adopted the Bankers' Code and still follows the general common law
rule, and thus found a sale instead of a creditor-debtor relation. However,
in light of the Lawton case, it appears that the South Carolina court would
have reached the same result under the code.
Thus the attempt by the Banker's Association to draft a statute which
would not only definitely determine the relation of the depositor with the
bank in regard to the deposit of commercial paper, but protect the bank in
case of failure of the correspondent bank,il has not completely fulfilled its
purpose. It is a matter of conjecture to determine how the Indiana courts
will apply Section Two of the code where a bank has given credit and a
right to the depositor to draw upon same. It is the opinion of the writer
for 1934, p. 160. Section 16 of the Act provides that--"'in the absence of
instructions to the contrary, an item received by a bank from a customer
having an account with such bank, will be deemed offered for immediate
credit to his account, . . . the bank will be deemed to have purchased it,
notwithstanding any stipulation on its part to the contrary." Thus this section
is contrary to Section 2 of the Bankers' Code, in that this act provides that
it is a purchase while the Code says such paper is received on an agency basis.
13 Farmers' Exchange Bank of Marshfield v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan
Ass'n of Missouri (Mo. App. 1932), 52 S. W. (2d) 608.
14 (1933) 332 Mo. 1041, 61 S. W. (2d) 717.
15 Lawton v. Lower Main St. Bank (1933), 170 S. C. 334, 170 S. E. 469.
16 Mr. Paton Jr., one of the drawers of the code, writes in 46 Bankers'
Law Journal, that it removes the danger to a collecting bank of being held as
owner of collection items which are indorsed by the depositors in blank. This
danger is due to the fact that the owner bank takes the risk in case there is a
default in the remittance after the item has been paid and its depositors dis-
charged. By making the bank an agent of the depositor, for any credit
extended or checked out the bank has full recourse against the depositor.
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that although to do so would change the past decisions of our state courts,1 7
the proper construction of the statute would be that given by the Missouri
Supreme Court; 1 8 namely, that an agency relation exists, unless there is an
express agreement otherwise. It is only by such a construction that the
statute can be given its intended operation. I. K.
STATUTES-TIME OF TAKING EFFEC.-Mandamus against a township trustee
to compel payment of the salary of the justice of the peace and an allowance
for office rent. Complainant relied on Chapter 308 and respondent on Chapter
323 of the Indiana Acts of 1913. Both acts were passed at the same session
of the legislature, both received executive approval on the same day, both
became effective at the same time, and both carried clauses repealing all laws
in conflict therewith. Chapter 308 was applicable to townships containing a
city having from 45,000 to 100,000 population and included an allowance for
office rent. Chapter 323 was applicable to townships containing one or more
cities with a combined population from 45,000 to 60,000, and there was no
allowance for office rent, though the same provision as to salary was made.
This chapter contained a phrase referring to fees "as now provided by law."
A prior act, Chapter 91, Acts of 1903, referred to the collection of fees by
justices of the peace in townships containing a city from 45,000 to 60,000
population. As the two acts of 1913 were inconsistent, it was necessary to
determine which was controlling, and the court affirmed judgment for the
complainant. Ross v. Chambers, (Ind. 1938), 14 N. E. (2d) 1012.
The problem here turns on a question of the time an act takes effect.
When a single act is involved the rule in England once was that acts took
effect from the date of the beginning of the session of Parliament, but this
was changed by statute to make the effective date the day the act received
the royal assent.1 In the United States a statute takes effect from the date
of its passage unless the time is fixed otherwise, either by the constitution, or
by a general satutory provision applicable to all enactments, or within the
act itself.2 The date of passage is defined by the courts as the date of the
last act necessary to give the bill the force and effect of law.3
17 Downey v. National Exchange Bank (1912), 52 Ind. App. 672, 96 N. E.
403; Olinger v. Sanders (1931), 92 Ind. App. 358, 174 N. E. 513.
18 See Note 14, supra.
1 See stat. 33 Geo. III; ch. 13. Rex. v. Justices of Middlesex (1831), 2
Barn. & Ad. 818, 109 Eng. Rep. 1347; Lattless, executrix, and Patton v. Holmes
(1792), 4 T. R. 660, 100 Eng. Rep. 1230; King v. Smith (1910), 1 K. B. 17.
2 Indiana's constitution provides that acts shall not be in effect until pub-
lished and circulated. Ind. Const. Art. IV, § 28. This provision has been
construed to mean that the statute takes effect at the precise time of publica-
tion. State v. Williams (1909), 173 Ind. 414, 90 N. E. 754, 140 Am. S. R. 261,
21 Ann. Cas. 986. The constitutional provisions vary widely. States requiring
publication date to determine date of passage are: Ind. Const. Art. IV, § 28;
Kan. Const. Art. II, § 19; N. M. Const. Art. IV, § 15; La. Const. §42; Wis.
Const. Art. VII, § 21. States fixing effective dates at definite time after
adjournment or passage are: Ariz. Const. Art. IV, Pt. I, § 1; Cal. Const.
Art. IV, § 1; Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 19; Fla. Const. Art. III, § 18; Ida. Const.
Art. III,§ 22; Ill. Const. Art. III, § 22; Iowa Const. Art. III, § 26; Ky. Const.§ 55; Md. Const. Art. III, § 31; Mass. Const., Referendum Amendment I;
Me. Const. Art. IV, §23; Nebr. Const. Art. III, §24; Ohio Const. Art. II,§ I c; Okla. Const. Art. V, § 58; Ore. Const. Art. IV, § 28; S. D. Const.
